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DIGITAL SOUND SAMPLING:
A RE-EVALUATION AFTER
GRAND UPRIGHT MUSIC David M. Bagdade'
INTRODUCTION
Digital sampling of recorded sounds is an issue
that has generated considerable controversy through-
out the record industry over the last several years,
raising questions as to the ownership of sounds, of
creative freedom and of ethics. During that time, the
practice has flourished in a system where, in the
absence of statutory or judicial guidelines, rules gov-
erning the conduct of those involved have been infor-
mal at best. In the first judicial expression on the
issue, though, a U.S. District Judge has equated sam-
pling with stealing, thereby sparking an even greater
controversy and spurring a flurry of debate and activi-
ty within the record industry. This decision, Grand
pright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc.,2 has
sent a strongly worded message to those engaging in
unauthorized sampling, and the record industry has
responded by re-evaluating its practices as other suits
follow in the wake of the Grand Upright decision. All
of this has contributed to the focusing of new atten-
tion on the entire sampling issue, calling into question
the right of artists to sample as well as the rights of
those being sampled. Now that the issue has been
forced, though, there exists the possibility that those
within the record industry will agree upon a more
coherent and workable framework for the licensing of
samples and for compensating the owner of sampled
material.
This Article will briefly discuss the history and the
nature of the controversy. Then it will provide a
detailed examination of the Grand Upright decision
and a view toward the future of digital sampling prac-
tices and legal action.
A BRIEF HISTORY
As the technical aspects of digital sampling have
been set forth in detail elsewhere, it is not the pur-
pose of this article to do so here.5 In its most com-
monly understood form, though, digital sampling
refers to the electronic borrowing of prerecorded
sounds for use on new recordings.4 Generally, the
process will involve the electronic lifting of a live or
recorded instrumental or vocal performance from its
original context, where it may then be sonically
processed or altered to suit the needs of the user
before being transplanted into a new musical context
in identical or altered form.5 This process is generally
performed with the assistance of a sophisticated key-
board.
Sampling is considered to have originated in the
early 1980s when disc jockeys and mixers in dance
clubs began to mix portions of different records
together to create "new" works.6 With the rise of rap
music later in the decade, the practice spread to the
recording studio, where producers and rappers would
splice prerecorded passages of other works into rap
recordings.7 As rap grew in popularity throughout the
decade, so did the practice of sampling, and it spread
to other musical genres, most notably pop and rock.
Almost from its inception in its present form, digi-
tal sampling has been a controversial topic through-
out the record industry. This controversy has certainly
been abetted by the differing perspectives of those
whose interests are actually involved. Many well-
known recording artists often do not wish to be sam-
pled, especially those artists who have developed a
so-called "signature sound" through years of hard
work, only to find that their distinctiveness makes
them an attractive source for samplers.8 Also, musi-
cians who make their living doing recording sessions
fear losing employment and income to sampled
equivalents of their talents.9 In addition, the owners of
mechanical rights in works being sampled decry the
loss of income.
On the other hand, producers and artists who
sample claim that they are involved in the creation of
new works and that their use of passages from older
recordings can actually stimulate new interest in the
older works; if they are prohibited from doing so,
they argue, such prohibition will have a chilling effect
on both the creation of new works and the develop-
ment of new technologies. 0 In essence, they claim,
they are involved in the most current phase in popu-
lar music's extensive history of recycling source mate-
rial."
Finally, there are the record companies, who
often have to view the issue from both sides-that is,
they are aware their catalog items are being sampled
while they continue to release new albums containing
increasing numbers of samples. As a result of this
dual perspective, no record company had sued over
the sampling of its catalog until very recently," since,
by winning such a suit, the company would run the
Fall, 1992 1 1
Bagdade: Digital Sound Sampling: A Re-Evaluation after Grand Upright Music
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
risk of contributing to a situation where the ability of
its own producers and artists to sample would be
crippled.
As the practice of sampling developed, it began to
take one of several forms. The first and most basic
involved the taking of a certain sound-for example,
an often-imitated drummer's snare-and the re-use of
that sound where the independent creation or imita-
tion of that sound would be impossible or impracti-
cal. In fact, as computers gained acceptance in
recording studios, it became common for producers
to store such distinctive sounds on floppy discs and
to use them over and over, with varying amounts of
electronic processing The earliest well-known sam-
pling dispute arose from such a use, when a sample
of percussionist David Earl Johnson was used in the
theme music for the television show "Miami Vice,"
composed and performed by keyboardist Jan
Hammer.' Johnson had earlier agreed to let Hammer
record him performing on a set of rare, old African
drums which produced a distinctive sound."5 The sam-
ple was featured prominently in Hammer's theme
music, and Johnson did not receive compensation or
credit for the sampled performance. 6 Johnson took
the issue up with the musicians' union, which
declined to become involved on his behalf since
Johnson had originally consented to let Hammer
record him.!7
The second and more controversial type of sam-
pling involves the actual electronic lifting of an instru-
mental or vocal passage from an existing recording
and embodying the passage into a new musical con-
text. Naturally, the amount of material taken and the
manner in which it is used has varied greatly; howev-
er, in many instances, it has been clear to knowledge-
able listeners that certain records are being sampled,
and that some are being sampled more than others.,8
This is the type of sampling complained of by the
plaintiff in Grand Uprtgbt, and most of the current
debate has revolved around this type.
THE RIGHTS INVOLVED
There are two copyrights involved in each copy-
righted recording which is sampled. The first, usually
owned by a music publisher, covers the underlying
musical composition. The other protects the recorded
performance of the composition, or sound recording,
which is owned by the record label. These two copy-
rights are treated very differently under the law.
The 1976 Copyright Act provides the owner of the
copyright in a composition with the exclusive first
right to perform the work publicly, to duplicate it, to
distribute copies, and to prepare derivative works
based on the original work.Y However, the Act also
provides that after a composition has been recorded
for the first time, anyone may re-record it provided
that the subsequent user obtains a compulsory
license.20 This means that the user must notify the
copyright owner of his intent to do so, and he must
pay royalties to the owner for each copy sold." If the
user gives the required notice, the copyright holder
cannot refuse to grant her permission to record the
composition.' In the record industry, such a license is
known as a "mechanical" license, as the licensee has
obtained the right to fix the new rendition of the
work in a sound recording. The resulting mechanical
royalty is set by statute, although the standard prac-
tice in the record industry is to pay seventy-five per-
cent of the statutory rate.? Generally, the record com-
pany releasing the new rendition of the composition
will assume the responsibility of both obtaining the
compulsory license from and paying the mechanical
royalty to the publisher.
However, copyright treatment of sound record-
ings has often been problematic. Sound recordings
were not even protected works until 1971, when the
1909 Copyright Act24 was amended by the Sound
Recording Amendment of 1971.25 The Amendment,
though, was primarily designed to counter the prob-
lem of record piracy, or the re-recording of complete
albums, which was rampant at the time.
Although sound recordings are expressly protect-
ed under the terms of the 1976 Act, the extent of that
protection is less than that afforded to the underlying
compositions. For example, Section 114(b) provides
that the owner's exclusive right under Section 106(2)
is limited to the right to prepare a derivative work in
which the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording
are rearranged, remixed or otherwise altered; the
owner has no right to keep others from duplicating
the sounds contained in the recording, so long as the
duplication is entirely the result of the independent
fixation of these sounds.26 In other words, one could
conceivably hire a group of session musicians to per-
form an exact sound-alike version without infringing
on the copyright in the sound recording, as long as
the imitation is the result of the independent fixation
of the musicians, rather than the lifting of sounds con-
tained in the copyrighted recording.27
In addition, Section 114 of the Act does not pro-
vide for a compulsory license or any other perfor-
mance rights with respect to sound recordings; there-
fore, there is no royalty framework set forth in the Act
upon which users may rely. Needless to say, this lack
of statutory guidance has contributed to the confusion
over how samples of recorded works are to be paid
for. As a result, several different licensing approaches
have been developed, based generally upon the
amount and character of what is sampled, how the
sampled material is used in terms of prominence and
frequency of appearance in the new recording, and
the fame of the sampler.?
One approach, of course, is to seek a gratis con-
sent, which the owner might grant in a situation
where the use is de minimus or the sampled material
is largely unrecognizable.?9 As one commentator has
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noted, however, free uses are uncommon, as a copy-
right holder will often want at least a token payment,
either to cover its own overhead or to reinforce the
principle that licenses are necessary even for nonsub-
stantial uses.3
Much more common is the payment of a one-time
flat fee to the copyright holder in exchange for the
right to use the sampled material and to claim exclu-
sive ownership of the new recording. This method is
often used where the source material is more recog-
nizable or where the use of the material is more sub-
stantial. The amounts paid for such flat fee licenses
have varied greatly." This approach can also work to
the advantage of the sampler or his record company.
Several producers are known to prefer this method in
order to eliminate potential problems and ensure that
they will retain some bargaining power? On the
other side, there are labels who are willing to license
samples for a one-time fee." In addition to receiving
income without having to sue, the label is then also
in a position to maintain some control over its catalog
and, again, to reinforce the principle that samplers
must pay to use copyrighted works.
Another approach has been to pay a royalty to
the copyright holder for each copy of the new work
sold. This generally comes about when the sampler
releases his record without obtaining clearances, or
where the taking or use have been substantial, or
both." Royalty arrangements are more common with
respect to the underlying composition than the sound
recording and are generally disfavored by record
companies." Regarding the composition, the publish-
er will receive a portion of the mechanical royalties-
and, in some cases, the mechanical rights-derived
from sales of the new work." A royalty agreement
regarding a sound recording will often take the form
of a master use license, rather than an actual transfer
of rights to the new work.Y While not as common as
the flat fee license, royalty cases have attracted more
publicity, especially when reached after the release of
the new work.
One additional approach has been to pay noth-
ing, and in many instances, to sample without obtain-
ing or even seeking the permission of the copyright
holder. It has been common in recent years for com-
panies to release records containing samples without
the samples having been cleared, with the intent to
reach an after-the-fact accomodation with the copy-
right holder when (and if) the holder learns that the
sampling has occurred, or to release the album while
the negotiations are ongoing.58 However, there have
been numerous instances of artists and producers
sampling works without permission and paying for
their samples only when forced to do so." In fact,
some attorneys have counseled samplers against seek-
ing permission in advance, since if a sampler is
denied permission and then samples anyway, then
the plaintiff can seek additional damages based on
the willful conduct of the samplers, which is especial-
ly troubling to potential defendants where the use
they made might have been otherwise arguably per-
missable °
THE GRAND UPRIGHT DECISION
As a result of the conflicting and competing inter-
ests involved in sampling, and the lack of any statuto-
ry guidance, there were few if any rules to govern the
conduct of those on either side of the issue.
Surprisingly, before Grand Lpright, there had been lit-
tle litigation over sampling, and the few notable cases
filed settled before trial.41 As a result, the courts had
not had the opportunity to step in and provide any
resolution.
The Grand Upright decision rendered by U.S.
District Judge Kevin Thomas Duffy, which begins
with the Biblical admonition "thou shalt not steal,"1, is
notable for its force and tone in addition to the ruling
itself. Therefore, a detailed examination of the opin-
ion sheds considerable light on the nature, history
and future of the sampling controversy.
The facts of the case were not seriously in dis-
pute. In March of 1991, rap artist Biz Markie recorded
a song entitled "Alone Again," which was released
later that year on his album "I Need A Haircut."3
"Alone Again" contained several samples from a 1972
recording by Gilbert O'Sullivan of a composition,
written by O'Sullivan as well, entitled "Alone Again
(Naturally)."" More specifically, Markie and his pro-
ducers sampled the first eight bars of the older work,
which were then made into a repeating pattern
known as a tape loop, and Markie then recorded his
own rap lyrics over the tape loop." In addition, the
phrase "alone again, naturally," arguably the lyrical
"hook" of O'Sullivan's recording, was also sampled."4
After the recording was made, but before the
record was released, Markie's attorney sent a tape of
"Alone Again" to O'Sullivan and his agent and
requested permission to use the sample.'7 However,
before any agreement regarding the use of the sample
could be reached, the "I Need A Haircut" album was
released on Cold Chillin' Records, a subsidiary of
Warner Bros. Records, Inc. Thereafter, O'Sullivan
refused to give permission and demanded that "I
Need A Haircut" be removed from the marketplace."
After several exchanges between the parties,
Grand Upright Music, Ltd., the assignee of the original
publisher and the holder of the copyright in the
underlying musical composition, filed suit in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York,
seeking a preliminary injunction.4 Named as defen-
dants were Markie, Cold Chillin', Warner Bros.
Records, and Markie's production and publishing
companies, as well as a number of other persons and
entities. The defendants admitted that the sampling
had in fact occurred.5 As a result, Judge Duffy ruled
that the only real issue was who owned the copy-
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rights to the underlying composition and to the mas-
ter recording of the original work by O'Sullivan."
After conducting a hearing, Judge Duffy ruled that
the plaintiff was the owner of the copyrights.z" In
reaching this conclusion, the judge relied on three
categories of proof." First, there were copies of the
copyright registrations to the work, which were in the
name of O'Sullivan's original publisher, and two
deeds, the first transferring the copyrights from the
publisher to O'Sullivan and the second transferring
them from O'Sullivan to the plaintiff." Over the defen-
dants' objections, the judge accepted the registrations
as valid public records pursuant to Rule 902 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and he admitted the trans-
fer documents as well. 5" He also found credible
O'Sullivan's testimony regarding his authorship of the
song and the defendants' attempts to secure permis-
sion from him."6
What the judge found most persuasive, however,
were the "actions and admissions of the defendants."7
He noted that, prior to the release of the album, the
defendants discussed among themselves the need to
obtain a license, which was followed by the letter to
O'Sullivan's agent.'8 The opinion notes that the letter
specifically requested O'Sullivan's consent and that
Markie's attorney "admittedly was seeking 'terms' for
the use of the material."" As a result, Judge Duffy
concluded that
[one would not agree to pay to use the
material of another unless there was a
valid copyright! What more persuasive
evidence can there be!"
The judge also quoted at length from a letter sent
by Markie's attorneys to Cold Chillin' and the other
defendants following the release of the album, where-
in Markie's counsel appeared to attempt in advance to
transfer the blame for any future liability, noting that
Cold Chillin' knew that sample requests were pending
and unresolved but chose to release "I Need A
Haircut" anyway:
Consequently, if any legal action arises in
connection with the samples in question,
such action will not arise due to the fact
that Biz used the samples in his recorded
compositions, but rather, due to the fact
that Cold Chillin' released such material
prior to the appropriate consents being
secured in connection with such
samples.6"
In addition, each defendant who testified knew
that it was necessary to obtain the owner's consent
before using the work in another piece, and Judge
Duffy also stated that, specifically, "Cold Chillin'
Records, Inc. knew that such clearances were neces-
sary.""' The judge briefly addressed the defendants'
contention that their conduct was essentially standard
practice in the record industry, but he was clearly
unimpressed:
ITihe argument suggested by the defen-
dants that they should be excused
because others in the "rap music" busi-
ness are also engaged in illegal activity is
totally specious. The mere statement of
the argument is its own refutation."
Based on the evidence, Judge Duffy concluded
that the defendants knew that they were violating the
plaintiffs rights "as well as the rights of others," and
that "W[their only aim was to sell thousands upon
thousands of records."" As a result, he granted the
preliminary injunction; in addition, he found that the
defendants' conduct was so egregious that "sterner
measures" were required.6' Therefore, in the last sen-
tence of the opinion, he referred the matter to the
U.S. Attorney for consideration of prosecution of the
defendants for criminal copyright infringement," and
noted further that "[tihe resolution of any issue left
open in this civil matter should have no bearing on
the potential criminal liability in the unique circum-
stances presented here."7
The effect of this ruling was felt immediately.
Although the case was settled soon afterward,"
Warner Bros. Records was still compelled to recall
thousands of albums." In addition, major record
labels began to take serious steps to ensure that they
would avoid a fate similar to that suffered by Warner
Bros. These steps ranged from inserting additional
clauses in their artist recording agreements, which
contractually placed the responsibility for unlicensed
samples on the artist, to requiring artists to submit
lists of samples used and to obtain clearances for
each prior to the release of the album?0
On the other side, copyright proprietors have
begun to monitor their own catalogs closely,7' and
other plaintiffs have stepped forward and filed cases.
The most notable of these was Tuff 'n' Rumble
Management Inc. v. DefJam Recordings Inc.,72 which
was filed during the same week that the Grand
Upright decision was issued.7' The plaintiff owned the
copyrights to a composition and recording entitled
"Impeach the President." The defendants sampled
the distinctive eight-beat drum break that began
"Impeach the President" without seeking a license."
While it had been the practice to seek clearances for
melodic or harmonic passages, this had generally not
been the case with respect to drum samples.? As a
result, the case, which settled shortly after it was
filed,- is significant since it appeared to attempt to
extend the Grand Upright holding to an area where
licenses usually had not been previously sought. This
issue is likely to arise again because, as Tuff 'N'
Rumble alleged, it is the drum track and lead vocal
that form the "musical basis" of rap recordings.'
At the time of this writing, Grand Upright is still
the only judicial expression on the issue, and, while
Judge Duffy's opinion is a strong statement, it is scant
on supporting law. Besides several brief cites to the
4 Journal of Art & Entertainment Law 4
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 1
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol3/iss1/1
1976 Act (and the Seventh Commandment), he makes
no mention of the potentially applicable causes of
action or defenses. A reading of the opinion leads
one to the conclusion that the plaintiff relied solely
on the Act, while the defendants offered what
appeared to be a fair use defense. Judge Duffy does
not make any mention of the legal support for either
side's arguments; rather, he appeared to regard his
conclusions as self-evident. As a result, there has still
been no definitive ruling as to what will state a cause
of action in a sampling case or a defense thereto.
A VIEW TOWARD THE FUTURE
The Grand Uprigbt decision and the Tuff 'n'
Rumble settlement have brought the entire issue of
digital sampling into the open. In order to avoid
potential liability, record labels have attempted to
institute a variety of safeguarding measures, including
the verification of clearances and the passing on of
the responsibility to the artist or the producer.
Notwithstanding these efforts, though, the issue will
only be resolved when the industry recognizes that
significant property rights are involved and that a
workable system of obtaining and paying for licenses
is needed. The obstacles to developing such a system
are substantial, involving, among other issues,
antitrust concerns, enforcement problems, and the
likelihood of future lawsuits. However, by adopting
the example of the individuals and labels who have
tried, the industry could avoid another adverse judi-
cial ruling. Composers and artists thrive on their cre-
ativity and originality; the industry would do well to
strike a balance between the protection of their
efforts with the need of the labels to exploit new and
exciting trends in popular music.
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